In KingSett Mortgage Corporation v. Mapleview Developments Ltd., the Court dismissed an appeal by two contractors who argued that the holdback deficiency under section 78(2) of the Construction Act should be calculated as ten percent of their total invoices rather than ten percent of unpaid invoices only. The Court held that where there were no subcontractor lien claims and a contractor’s invoices had been fully paid, there was no deficiency in the holdbacks relating to those paid invoices. To hold otherwise would result in double recovery for the contractor, upset the statutory balance between lien claimants and mortgagees and lead to a commercial absurdity.

In Purolator Inc. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers, the Court held that the application of s. 102 of the Courts of Justice Act, which requires notice to be given before an injunction can be issued to restrain an act in connection with a labour dispute, turns on the connection between the enjoined activity and the labour dispute, not on whether the moving party is itself a disputant. Since CUPW’s picketing of Purolator was connected to the labour dispute between Canada Post and CUPW (with Purolater being 91% owned by Canada Post and where the latter’s CEO sat on the former’s board), and no notice was given, the injunction was set aside for lack of jurisdiction.

In Miller Estate v. Arguelles, the Court allowed an appeal from a Divisional Court decision upholding the termination by the Landlord Tenant Board of a tenancy for landlord’s own use. The Court held that the death of the landlord prior to the termination of the tenancy invalidated the N12 notice because neither the landlord’s son nor the Estate met the statutory standing criteria under section 48 of the RTA. The Court further held that the landlord’s failure to disclose a prior issued N12 notice in the eviction application, as required by section 71.1, was a mandatory substantive deficiency that could not be cured by amendment by the Board at the hearing. The Court discussed the standard of review of a Divisional Court decision and the remedial purpose of the Residential Tenancies Act.

In Shafiq v. Ramsay, a companion decision to Miller Estate v. Arguelles, the Court set aside the Divisional Court’s decision enforcing the Board’s decision to evict the appellant. The Court held that the eviction application was invalid and should never have been accepted because of the respondent’s failure to include details of a previously served N12 notice under section 71.1 of the RTA. It further held that the Board, in determining whether the eviction should be refused, failed to consider all the circumstances under section 83 of the RTA, including the appellant’s cognitive impairments.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

KingSett Mortgage Corporation v. Mapleview Developments Ltd., 2026 ONCA 512

Keywords: Contracts, Construction, Liens, Holdback, Priorities, Mortgages, Statutory Interpretation, Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Receiverships, Construction Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30, sections 1(1), 14(1), 22(1), 22(3), 31(1), 31(2), 34(1), 36(1), 36(2), 78(2), 78(5), Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, section 193, 243(1), Dufferin Concrete Products v. Waterbrooke Development Ltd. (1992), 8 C.L.R. (2d) 132 (Ont. Gen. Div.), Pegah Construction Ltd. v. Panterra Mansions Joint Venture Corp., 2014 ONSC 3966, 2403177 Ontario Inc. v. Bending Lake Iron Group Limited, 2016 ONCA 225, BCIMC Construction Fund Corporation v. 33 Yorkville Residences Inc., 2023 ONCA 1, Scott, Pichelli & Easter Limited v. Dupont Developments Ltd., 2022 ONCA 757, Trebell v. Canada Life Assurance Company, 2026 ONCA 481, Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, R. v. Breault, 2023 SCC 9, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, R. v. J.D., 2022 SCC 15, Brooks v. Mundy (1914), 16 D.L.R. 119 (Ont. C.A.), Otis Elevator Co. Ltd. et al. v. Commonwealth Holiday Inns of Canada Ltd. et al. (1972), 2 O.R. 536 (Ont. Co. Ct.), Doig v. Stehn (1924), 2 D.L.R. 627 (Sask. C.A.), BCIMC Construction Fund Corp. et al. v. 33 Yorkville Residences Inc et al., 2022 ONSC 2326, Bianco v. Deem Management Services Limited, 2021 ONCA 859, Proex Logistics Inc. (Re), 2025 ONCA 832, North House Foods Ltd. (Re), 2025 ONCA 563, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Business Development Bank of Canada v. Pine Tree Resorts Inc., 2013 ONCA 282, Dal Bianco v. Deem Management Services Limited, 2020 ONCA 585

Purolator Inc. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2026 ONCA 515

Keywords: Labour and Employment, Picketing, Civil Procedure, Prohibitory Injunctions, Statutory Interpretation, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43, ss. 19(1)(b), 101, 102, 102(1), 102(2), 102(3), 102(4), 102(5), 102(6), 102(8), 102(10), Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 197, s. 17, Purolator Inc. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2025 ONCA 565, Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment Ltd. v. Pomeroy [No. 2] (1999), 49 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 285 (Ont. Gen. Div.), Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Gill at al., 2013 ONSC 256, Trudel and Sons Roofing Ltd. v. Canadian Union of Shinglers and Allied Workers, [1994] O.J. No. 1528 (Gen. Div.), RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, Taylor v. Newfoundland and Labrador, 2026 SCC 5, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, Mantini v. Smith Lyons LLP (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 505 (C.A.), Lawrence v. Toronto Humane Society (2006), 212 O.A.C. 263 (C.A.), Intercap Equity Inc. v. Bellman, 2022 ONCA 61, ReKitchener-Waterloo Real Estate Board Inc. and Ontario Regional Assessment Commissioner, Region No. 21 et al (1986), 56 O.R. (2d) 94 (H.C.), R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., 2002 SCC 8, Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes, (Toronto: Frank Fogg Queen’s Printer, 1968)

Miller Estate v. Arguelles, 2026 ONCA 518

Keywords: Real Property, Residential Tenancies, Termination, Notice, Eviction Orders, Administrative Law, Standard of Review, Standing, Statutory Interpretation, Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, ss.  1, 2, 48(1) and (5), 71.1, 72(1), 83(1), 183, 187(2), 202(1)(a), and 210(1), 202(1)(a) Estates Administration Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.22, ss. 2(1), 4, and 16, Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, s. 58(1), Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, Protecting Tenants and Strengthening Community Housing Act, 2020, S.O. 2020, c. 16, Schedule 4, Smith v. Youthlink Youth Services, 2022 ONCA 313, Honsberger v. Great Lake Forest Resources Ltd., 2019 ONCA 44, Onyskiw v. CJM Property Management Ltd., 2016 ONCA 477, Elkins v. Van Wissen, 2023 ONCA 789, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, White v. Upper Thames River Conservation Authority, 2022 ONCA 146, Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, La Presse inc. v. Quebec, 2023 SCC 22, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority v. Godwin (2002), 161 O.A.C. 57 (C.A.), Price v. Turnbull’s Grove Inc., 2007 ONCA 408, The Law Society of Upper Canada v. Chiarelli, 2014 ONCA 391, Ricketts v. Veerisingnam, 2025 ONSC 841, Hefzi v. Louw, 2023 BCSC 994, Schuld v. Li, 2025 BCSC 681, Slapsys (c.o.b. 1406393 Ontario Inc.) v. Abrams, 2010 ONCA 676, Ben-Margi v. Yi, 2024 ONLTB 64298, Zuidersma v. Duke, 2022 CanLII 122598 (ON LTB), 2709 Lakeshore Holding Inc. v. Offei et al, 2024 ONLTB 2711, Murray v. Lynch, 2025 ONLTB 31412, Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721

Shafiq v. Ramsay, 2026 ONCA 517

Keywords: Real Property, Residential Tenancies, Termination, Notice, Eviction Orders, Administrative Law, Standard of Review, Statutory Interpretation, Residential Tenancies Act, S.O. 2006, c. 17, ss. 48, 71.1, 83, 209(2), 210, Protecting Tenants and Strengthening Community Housing Act, 2020, S.O. 2020, c. 16, Schedule 4, Arguelles v. Estate of Ann Miller, 2025 ONSC 112, Smith v. Youthlink Youth Services, 2022 ONCA 313, Honsberger v. Great Lake Forest Resources Ltd., 2019 ONCA 44, Onyskiw v. CJM Property Management Ltd., 2016 ONCA 477, leave to appeal ref’d, [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 397, Elkins v. Van Wissen, 2023 ONCA 789, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, White v. Upper Thames River Conservation Authority, 2022 ONCA 146, Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, Miller Estate v. Arguelles, 2026 ONCA 518, Timbercreek Asset Management Inc. v. Soufi, 2024 ONSC 4041, Abdalla v. Kooirala, 2023 ONSC 7106

Short Civil Decisions

Petrisor v. Ramani, 2026 ONCA 520

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Costs, Panel Review, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, section 7(5), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 61.13(3.1), Machado v. Ontario Hockey Association, 2019 ONCA 210, Hillmount Capital Inc. v. Pizale, 2021 ONCA 364

Nabrotzky v. Bell, 2026 ONCA 525

Keywords: Real Property, Adverse Possession

Bertucci v. Toronto Fashion Group Limited, 2026 ONCA 524

Keywords: Conflict of Laws, Private International Law, Foreign Judgments, Recognition and Enforcement, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Discoverability, Limitations Act 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, s 13, Bertucci v. The Toronto Fashion Group Limited et al., 2024 ONSC 938

Ataei v. Kalantari, 2026 ONCA 523

Keywords: Family Law, Domestic Contracts, Separation Agreements, Setting Aside, Duress, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Costs, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s 56(4), Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, r 24(3), Davies v. Jane, 2025 ONCA 752, Brad-Jay Investments Ltd. v. Szijjarto (2006), 218 O.A.C. 315 (C.A.), Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9, Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867

CIVIL DECISIONS

KingSett Mortgage Corporation v. Mapleview Developments Ltd., 2026 ONCA 512

Simmons, Paciocco and Osborne JJ.A.

Counsel:

R. Kennaley, for the appellants, Alpa Stairs and Railings Inc. and Newmar Window Manufacturing Inc.
A. Soutter and A. Wyville, for the respondent, Dunsire Homes Inc.

Keywords: Contracts, Construction, Liens, Holdback, Priorities, Mortgages, Statutory Interpretation, Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Receiverships, Construction Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30, sections 1(1), 14(1), 22(1), 22(3), 31(1), 31(2), 34(1), 36(1), 36(2), 78(2), 78(5), Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, section 193, 243(1), Dufferin Concrete Products v. Waterbrooke Development Ltd. (1992), 8 C.L.R. (2d) 132 (Ont. Gen. Div.), Pegah Construction Ltd. v. Panterra Mansions Joint Venture Corp., 2014 ONSC 3966, 2403177 Ontario Inc. v. Bending Lake Iron Group Limited, 2016 ONCA 225, BCIMC Construction Fund Corporation v. 33 Yorkville Residences Inc., 2023 ONCA 1, Scott, Pichelli & Easter Limited v. Dupont Developments Ltd., 2022 ONCA 757, Trebell v. Canada Life Assurance Company, 2026 ONCA 481, Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, R. v. Breault, 2023 SCC 9, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, R. v. J.D., 2022 SCC 15, Brooks v. Mundy (1914), 16 D.L.R. 119 (Ont. C.A.), Otis Elevator Co. Ltd. et al. v. Commonwealth Holiday Inns of Canada Ltd. et al. (1972), 2 O.R. 536 (Ont. Co. Ct.), Doig v. Stehn (1924), 2 D.L.R. 627 (Sask. C.A.), BCIMC Construction Fund Corp. et al. v. 33 Yorkville Residences Inc et al., 2022 ONSC 2326, Bianco v. Deem Management Services Limited, 2021 ONCA 859, Proex Logistics Inc. (Re), 2025 ONCA 832, North House Foods Ltd. (Re), 2025 ONCA 563, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Business Development Bank of Canada v. Pine Tree Resorts Inc., 2013 ONCA 282, Dal Bianco v. Deem Management Services Limited, 2020 ONCA 585

Facts:

Mapleview Developments Ltd. (“Mapleview”) was developing a residential townhouse project in Barrie, Ontario. The appellants, Alpa Stairs and Railings Inc. (“Alpa”) and Newmar Window Manufacturing Inc. (“Newmar”), were contractors retained by Mapleview to supply services or materials to the development. Each contracted directly with Mapleview, and there were no subcontractor lien claimants related to either appellant.

The project ran into financial difficulty and Mapleview defaulted on its repayment obligations to its senior secured lender, KingSett Mortgage Corporation (“KingSett”). On application by KingSett, a receiver was appointed over the project. The receiver conducted a sales process, and the court approved a sale of the project to Dunsire Homes Inc. (“Dunsire”). The purchase price was calculated as an amount sufficient to repay KingSett in full, together with all “Priority Payables,” which included amounts having priority pursuant to section 78(2) of the Construction Act.

By the time of the insolvency, Alpa had submitted invoices totalling $1,100,604.80 and had received full payment for invoices rendered before April 28, 2023, but only partial payments thereafter, leaving a balance owing of $195,615.55. Newmar had submitted invoices totalling $2,924,385.76 and had received full payment for invoices rendered before March 2, 2023, but only partial payments thereafter, leaving a balance owing of $445,756.09. Each appellant registered and perfected a construction lien for the amounts owing to them.

The parties agreed that the appellants were entitled to a Priority Payables claim under the Lien Claimants’ Reserve but could not agree on the amount. The appellants took the position that the amount was to be calculated as ten percent of the total amounts invoiced for all services and materials supplied. Dunsire took the position that the amount should be calculated as ten percent of the unpaid invoices only.

The motion judge concluded that, as a matter of horizontal stare decisis, she was bound by Dufferin Concrete Products v. Waterbrooke Development Ltd., which held that once contractor invoices were paid in full, that contractor was not entitled to any priority for any holdback referable to those fully paid invoices, as this would amount to double recovery. The motion judge calculated each appellant’s Priority Payables claim as ten percent of the value of the unpaid invoices only.

issues:

Whether any deficiency in the holdbacks under section 78(2) of the Construction Act was to be calculated as a proportion of unpaid invoices or total invoices rendered under a contract for an improvement.

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No. In circumstances where there were no subcontractor lien claims at the time of the priority dispute and a payer had fully paid invoices from a contractor, there was no deficiency in the holdbacks related to those services or materials fully paid for. Any deficiency was therefore properly calculated as a proportion of unpaid invoices from the contractor.

The Court held that the analysis of whether there was “any deficiency in the holdbacks” in the context of a priority dispute under section 78(2) required consideration of two factors: whether there were any liens that could be claimed against the holdback at the time of the priority dispute; and if so, whether those liens had been satisfied. Where an invoice had been paid to the contractor in full, no lien could arise, or if it did, any lien had been fully satisfied. It followed from the plain language of section 22(1) that, where there were no subcontractor lien claimants at the time of the priority dispute, there was no deficiency in the holdbacks related to the services or materials supplied pursuant to fully paid invoices.

The Court further held that even if the relevant provisions were ambiguous, to accept the appellants’ position would yield a commercially absurd result. It would require a “double counting” of the ten percent already paid to the contractor, effectively making the holdback closer to twenty percent. This was unfair to the building mortgagee, who would be required to pay holdback amounts the contractor had already received, resulting in the contractor being paid twice for the same amount. It was also unfair to the owner’s other creditors who were disadvantaged by the insolvency.

The Court observed that the Construction Act was not intended to favour lien claimants but rather to strike a balance between the competing interests of owners, contractors, subcontractors and mortgagees. The result in Dufferin Concrete maintained this balance. The Court emphasized that this conclusion was limited to circumstances where there were no subcontractor lien claimants at the time of the priority dispute, and that the result might be very different if subcontractor lien claimants were present.

Purolator Inc. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2026 ONCA 515

Copeland, Monahan and Gomery JJ.A.

Counsel:

S. Moreau and R. White, for the appellant
C. Rae and A. Gilani, for the respondent

Keywords: Labour and Employment, Picketing, Civil Procedure, Prohibitory Injunctions, Statutory Interpretation, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43, ss. 19(1)(b), 101, 102, 102(1), 102(2), 102(3), 102(4), 102(5), 102(6), 102(8), 102(10), Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 197, s. 17, Purolator Inc. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2025 ONCA 565, Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment Ltd. v. Pomeroy [No. 2] (1999), 49 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 285 (Ont. Gen. Div.), Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Gill at al., 2013 ONSC 256, Trudel and Sons Roofing Ltd. v. Canadian Union of Shinglers and Allied Workers, [1994] O.J. No. 1528 (Gen. Div.), RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, Taylor v. Newfoundland and Labrador, 2026 SCC 5, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, Mantini v. Smith Lyons LLP (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 505 (C.A.), Lawrence v. Toronto Humane Society (2006), 212 O.A.C. 263 (C.A.), Intercap Equity Inc. v. Bellman, 2022 ONCA 61, Re Kitchener-Waterloo Real Estate Board Inc. and Ontario Regional Assessment Commissioner, Region No. 21 et al (1986), 56 O.R. (2d) 94 (H.C.), R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., 2002 SCC 8, Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes, (Toronto: Frank Fogg Queen’s Printer, 1968)

facts:

The Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) commenced a nationwide strike against Canada Post on November 15, 2024. CUPW members began picketing outside a Purolator facility on November 28, 2024. On November 29, 2024, they began stopping exiting Purolator trucks for 15 to 31 minutes each. That same day, Purolator obtained an interim injunction under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act (CJA) restraining the picketing.

Purolator’s motion for an injunction was initially brought on an ex parte basis, even though s. 102 of the CJA did not permit ex parte injunctions in the context of labour disputes except in certain limited circumstances. The motion judge found that s. 102 did not apply since Purolator was not a “disputant” in the labour dispute between Canada Post and CUPW, despite Canada Post owning 91% of Purolator’s shares and having its CEO and Chair on Purolator’s board and held that s. 101, not s. 102 of the CJA applied. The injunction ceased to have effect on January 15, 2025.

CUPW appealed, arguing that s. 102 rather than s. 101 of the CJA applied to Purolator’s motion and that the motion judge erred in issuing the injunction on an ex parte basis under s. 101. Purolator brought a motion to quash the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that because the motion judge issued the injunction under s. 101, the proper appeal route was to the Divisional Court. A three-judge panel dismissed Purolator’s motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction (the “ONCA Jurisdiction Decision“), holding that the injunction was in substance governed by s. 102. By the time of the merits appeal, the injunction had expired and CUPW’s membership had ratified a collective agreement with Canada Post, resolving the underlying labour dispute.

issues:

1. Was the merits appeal moot, and should the Court exercise its discretion to determine the primary issue on appeal relating to the proper interpretation of s. 102 of the CJA?
2. Was it necessary to decide whether the ONCA Jurisdiction Decision had already determined the substantive merits of the appeal?
3. Did the motion judge err in issuing the injunction under s. 101 of the CJA, rather than s. 102?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

1. Yes and yes. The appeal was moot because the injunction had expired on January 15, 2025, and the underlying labour dispute had since been fully resolved by a collective agreement, leaving no live controversy between the parties. Nonetheless, the Court exercised its residual discretion to hear the moot appeal, considering the existence of an adversarial context, judicial economy and the need to limit courts to their proper adjudicative role. The proper interpretation of s. 102 of the CJA was found to be an important general issue of law that had never been resolved by the Court and might otherwise evade appellate review, and both parties had fully argued the issue and agreed it should be decided. By contrast, the Court declined to exercise its discretion to address CUPW’s separate ground of appeal concerning the breadth of the injunction, finding that issue highly fact-specific, of limited precedential value, and not worth the judicial resources required given the extensive record.
2. It was unnecessary to decide whether the ONCA Jurisdiction Decision had already determined the substantive merits of the appeal, since the issue had only been briefly discussed in the parties’ submissions and the Court reached the same conclusion on the merits regardless of whether it was bound by that earlier decision.
3. Section 102 applies whenever an injunction is sought to restrain “an act in connection with a labour dispute,” with the focus on the connection between the act and the labour dispute rather than on whether the moving party is itself a “disputant”. The motion judge erred by asking whether Purolator was a party to the labour dispute rather than whether the picketing was connected to it. The Court acknowledged that the phrase “in connection with” had consistently been given a broad meaning in jurisprudence, consistent with the purpose of s. 102 in providing enhanced procedural protections for injunctions in the labour context, and with a seminal appellate decision holding that all picketing, primary or secondary, was permitted unless it became tortious or criminal in nature. Applying this interpretation, CUPW’s picketing of Purolator was connected to the labour dispute, given Canada Post’s 91% ownership of Purolator and its CEO and Chair sitting on Purolator’s board. Section 102(2) of the CJA provides that, subject to certain limited exceptions, injunctions restraining an “act in connection with a labour dispute” should not be issued without notice. CUPW’s picketing of Purolator’s premises fell within the meaning of “an act in connection with a labour dispute” contemplated by s. 102 of the CJA, and an injunction prohibiting the activity could only have been issued in accordance with the notice requirements of that section. Since Purolator did not dispute that notice was not given as required by s. 102, the injunction was issued without jurisdiction and had to be set aside.

Miller Estate v. Arguelles, 2026 ONCA 518

Roberts, Coroza and Rahman JJ.A.

Counsel:

K. Andrews, for the appellant
J. Kennedy, for the respondent, the Estate of Ann Miller
L. Naidoo, for the Landlord and Tenant Board

Keywords: Real Property, Residential Tenancies, Termination, Notice, Eviction Orders, Administrative Law, Standard of Review, Standing, Statutory Interpretation, Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, ss.  1, 2, 48(1) and (5), 71.1, 72(1), 83(1), 183, 187(2), 202(1)(a), and 210(1), 202(1)(a) Estates Administration Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.22, ss. 2(1), 4, and 16, Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, s. 58(1), Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, Protecting Tenants and Strengthening Community Housing Act, 2020, S.O. 2020, c. 16, Schedule 4, Smith v. Youthlink Youth Services, 2022 ONCA 313, Honsberger v. Great Lake Forest Resources Ltd., 2019 ONCA 44, Onyskiw v. CJM Property Management Ltd., 2016 ONCA 477, Elkins v. Van Wissen, 2023 ONCA 789, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, White v. Upper Thames River Conservation Authority, 2022 ONCA 146, Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, La Presse inc. v. Quebec, 2023 SCC 22, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority v. Godwin (2002), 161 O.A.C. 57 (C.A.), Price v. Turnbull’s Grove Inc., 2007 ONCA 408, The Law Society of Upper Canada v. Chiarelli, 2014 ONCA 391, Ricketts v. Veerisingnam, 2025 ONSC 841, Hefzi v. Louw, 2023 BCSC 994, Schuld v. Li, 2025 BCSC 681, Slapsys (c.o.b. 1406393 Ontario Inc.) v. Abrams, 2010 ONCA 676, Ben-Margi v. Yi, 2024 ONLTB 64298, Zuidersma v. Duke, 2022 CanLII 122598 (ON LTB), 2709 Lakeshore Holding Inc. v. Offei et al, 2024 ONLTB 2711, Murray v. Lynch, 2025 ONLTB 31412, Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721

facts:

This decision is the companion decision to Shafiq v. Ramsay, 2026 ONCA 517, released concurrently. The appellant had been a tenant of the subject unit since 2017. The unit was owned by Ms. M and managed by her son, Mr. M. In March 2022, the appellant was served with an N12 notice of eviction for landlord’s own use, listing Ms. M and her son as landlords. The notice stated the unit was needed for occupancy by the landlord’s child (Ms. M’s daughter). The appellant initially agreed to move but when they could not find another residence, they refused to leave. A second N12 notice was served in June 2022, again stating that the unit was needed for the landlord’s child. The appellant refused to move.

Mr. M filed an eviction application based on the June 2022 N12 notice. The application did not include details of the earlier March 2022 N12 notice. Ms. M died on December 7, 2022, before the eviction hearing. The Board allowed the eviction application, substituting the Estate of Ms. M as the applicant and amending the application to include the details of the March 2022 notice. The Board’s decision was confirmed on review and upheld by the Divisional Court. The tenant appealed.

issues:

1. Did the death of Ms. M render the June 2022 N12 notice invalid and the eviction application a nullity because there was no individual applicant at the time of the hearing who had standing to terminate the tenancy and evict the appellant for the landlord’s own use under s. 48 of the RTA?
2. Did the Board err by amending the application to include details of the March 2022 N12 notice?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

The Court first addressed two preliminary matters. On the standard of review, the Court is to ask whether the Divisional Court identified the appropriate standard of review to the Landlord and Tenant Board’s decision and applied it correctly: Smith v. Youthlink Youth Services, at para. 16; Honsberger v. Great Lake Forest Resources Ltd., at para. 17. To do so, the Court steps into the shoes of the Divisional Court and focuses on the correctness of the original Board decision: Onyskiw v. CJM Property Management Ltd., at para. 27, leave to appeal ref’d.

An appeal from the Board’s decision is limited to questions of law and procedural fairness: s. 210(1) of the RTA. The Divisional Court’s failure to identify and address Board errors of law is an error of law: Elkins v. Van Wissen, at para. 77. Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to correctness: Housen v. Nikolaisen, at para. 8; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, at para. 37; White v. Upper Thames River Conservation Authority, at para. 7; Elkins, at para. 37. The standard of review on questions of procedural fairness is correctness: Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, at paras. 27, 30; Vavilov, at para. 37.

Secondly, the RTA is remedial legislation with a tenant protection focus and must therefore receive a fair, large and liberal construction that will best ensure its protective purpose is attained, resolving any ambiguity in favour of its tenant protection objects: Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority v. Godwin at para. 19; Price v. Turnbull’s Grove Inc., at paras. 26 and 44; The Law Society of Upper Canada v. Chiarelli, at para. 72, leave to appeal ref’d; Honsberger, at para. 19; Ricketts v. Veerisingnam, at para. 97.

1. The June 2022 N12 notice was invalid because it did not comply with section 48 of the RTA. The plain language of subsections 48(1) and (5) requires that only an individual landlord may terminate a tenancy for the landlord’s own use. The prescribed criteria must be in place at the time of termination, not merely at the time the N12 notice was delivered. Ms. M’s death prior to the termination of the tenancy meant that neither her son nor her Estate had the requisite standing under subsection 48(1) to continue the application. Mr. M had no standing because a landlord’s sister is not among the listed individuals who may take possession under the landlord’s own use provision. The Estate was not an individual and therefore could not invoke section 48(1) or have a spouse, child, or parent for the purposes of that provision. Further, there was no appointed personal representative or evidence that the Will had been probated, making it impossible to ascertain who the individual landlord was for the purpose of subsection 48(1). The Board and the Divisional Court erred by treating the substitution of the Estate as a mere procedural matter when it was a substantive deficiency that section 183 of the RTA could not cure.
2. The Board erred by amending the eviction application to include the details of the March 2022 N12 notice. Subsection 71.1(3) requires a landlord to set out the details of every N12 notice given within two years prior to filing the eviction application, and subsection 71.1(4) requires the Board to refuse to accept the application for filing if the landlord has not complied. The use of the word “shall” in these provisions is mandatory. The requirement to disclose past notices exists not only for the benefit of the particular tenant, but to permit the Board to monitor possible misuse of landlord’s own use evictions and identify patterns of non-compliance. The Board’s decision to amend the eviction application treated these mandatory substantive requirements as discretionary and procedural, undermining the remedial, tenant-focused purpose of the RTA. The eviction application should not have proceeded and was a nullity.

Shafiq v. Ramsay, 2026 ONCA 517

Roberts, Coroza, and Rahman

Counsel:

J. Done, W. Florence, and L. Thompson, for the appellant
No one appearing for the respondent
A. Solomon, for the Landlord and Tenant Board

Keywords: Real Property, Residential Tenancies, Termination, Notice, Eviction Orders, Administrative Law, Standard of Review, Statutory Interpretation, Residential Tenancies Act, S.O. 2006, c. 17, ss. 48, 71.1, 83, 209(2), 210, Protecting Tenants and Strengthening Community Housing Act, 2020, S.O. 2020, c. 16, Schedule 4, Arguelles v. Estate of Ann Miller, 2025 ONSC 112, Smith v. Youthlink Youth Services, 2022 ONCA 313, Honsberger v. Great Lake Forest Resources Ltd., 2019 ONCA 44, Onyskiw v. CJM Property Management Ltd., 2016 ONCA 477, leave to appeal ref’d, [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 397, Elkins v. Van Wissen, 2023 ONCA 789, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, White v. Upper Thames River Conservation Authority, 2022 ONCA 146, Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, Miller Estate v. Arguelles, 2026 ONCA 518, Timbercreek Asset Management Inc. v. Soufi, 2024 ONSC 4041, Abdalla v. Kooirala, 2023 ONSC 7106

facts:

This decision is the companion decision to Miller Estate v. Arguelles, 2026 ONCA 518, released concurrently. The appellant had been a tenant of the respondent’s rental unit since 2012. On July 1, 2021, the respondent served the appellant with an N12 notice pursuant to section 48 of the Residential Tenancies Act (“RTA”) to vacate the rental unit for the respondent landlord’s own use. The 2021 notice stipulated that the appellant was required to vacate the unit by August 31, 2021, which was less than the required 60 days’ notice. The respondent ultimately decided not to proceed with the 2021 notice. On April 10, 2022, the respondent served the appellant with another notice requiring the appellant to vacate the rental unit for the respondent’s own use by June 30, 2022. The respondent then filed an eviction application with the Landlord and Tenant Board (the “Board”) on July 27, 2022. In the application, the respondent had checked off the box that he had not given any other N12 notices in the past two years, thereby failing to mention the July 2021 notice.

The hearing took place before the Board on March 20, 2023; however, the appellant did not attend. As a result, the Board accepted the respondent’s uncontested testimony. The Board then made an order on August 18, 2023, to terminate the tenancy and granted an eviction order, effective August 29, 2023. On September 11, 2023, the appellant sought a review of the Board’s order on the basis that the appellant could not reasonably participate in the hearing because he had not received the April 2022 N12 notice, the eviction application, or the notice of the March 20, 2023, hearing. In the alternative, the appellant sought a review on the basis that he suffered from significant cognitive impairments, reads poorly, and has difficulty understanding legal documents. He submitted that without legal representation, he did not have the capacity to engage in a legal proceeding. The appellant also requested a review on the basis that the respondent had failed to comply with section 71.1 of the RTA when he failed to include the details from the previous N12 notices in his eviction application.

The Board dismissed the appellant’s review request on December 15, 2023. The Board found that the respondent had personally served the appellant with the 2022 N12 notice. Moreover, the Notice of the March 20, 2023 hearing had been properly served according to the Board’s files. The Board also concluded that the respondent’s failure to check the correct box in his eviction application was an oversight, but that it did not ultimately have a prejudicial effect on the appellant. The appellant then requested a review of the December 15, 2023 review order on January 12, 2024. The Board exercised its discretion to conduct a second review without an oral hearing but found that the 2023 review order contained no serious errors. Neither review addressed the appellant’s submission that he was not reasonably able to participate because he did not have the capacity to engage in a legal proceeding due to his personal circumstances. On May 2, 2025, the Divisional Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal but ordered that the eviction not be enforced for 30 days. The Divisional Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the failure to disclose details of previous N12 notices invalidated the eviction application. The Divisional Court also concluded that the Board’s finding that the notice of hearing had been served on the appellant was a factual finding that could not be appealed.

issues:

1. Did the Divisional Court err in upholding the Board’s interpretation of section 71.1 of the RTA?
2. Did the Divisional Court err in upholding the Board’s decision that the appellant was “reasonably able to participate” under section 209(2) of the RTA?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

1. The Court held that the eviction application was invalid because of the respondent’s failure to include details of a previously served N12 notice. Relying on its companion decision in Miller Estate v. Arguelles, the Court held that it was an error of law to treat as discretionary the mandatory consequences flowing from a failure to reference all the details of previously served N12 notices in the eviction application under section 71.1 of the RTA. The Court held that the Board and the Divisional Court’s approach undermined the remedial tenant-focused purpose of the RTA. The Court found that the language in section 71.1 of the RTA was clear: a failure to provide details of previously served N12 notices would result in a refusal to file the eviction application, and that it was not merely a technical requirement.

The Court also found that the Board’s focus on the prejudice suffered by the appellant misread the mandatory statutory requirements of section 71.1, and the context of section 48 of the RTA. The Court stated that notification of tenants is only one purpose of section 71.1 of the RTA. The purpose of section 71.1 of the RTA is, among others, to prevent abuse of the landlord’s own use provision under section 48(1) of the RTA. The Court concluded that the Board’s reasons ignored this purpose.

2. Yes. The Court held that the interpretation under section 209(2) of the RTA adopted by the Divisional Court was overly narrow and failed to consider all relevant circumstances, which was an error in law. According to Section 209(2) of the RTA, the Board can review its own orders if a party to the proceeding was not reasonably able to participate. The Court noted that the Board’s reasons did not conclude that the appellant had not actually received the notice, but focused on why the appellant should have received the notice. In any case, the Court concluded that the Board’s findings on this point were open to it on the record and not tainted by error in principle or a misapprehension of the evidence, therefore, these findings were not subject to appeal.

However, the Court noted that these findings did not conclude the analysis and that the Board should have further considered whether the appellant was reasonably able to participate under section 209(2) of the RTA, considering his disabilities, and should have considered whether the eviction should have been refused, having regard to all the circumstances under section 83 of the RTA. As a result, the Board’s analysis led to serious procedural and substantive unfairness to the appellant. Firstly, the appellant was unable to raise the invalidity of the N12 notice and the mandatory consequences that flowed under section 71.1 of the RTA. Secondly, the appellant was unable to test the respondent’s evidence about his good faith intention to occupy the unit. The Court noted that this was a significant loss, since the respondent’s reasons to occupy the unit varied in his N12 notices. Finally, the appellant was denied the benefit of consideration of whether the eviction should be refused considering all the circumstances under section 83 of the RTA. These circumstances included the disability of the appellant and his co-tenant, that the appellant was a tenant for 14 years, and that his tenancy was being terminated through no fault of his own, but because the landlord wished to terminate under section 48 of the RTA for various reasons that kept changing. This all also occurred without complying with the mandatory provision of section 71.1 of the RTA.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Petrisor v. Ramani, 2026 ONCA 520

Sossin, Monahan and Osborne JJ.A.

Counsel:

N.P., acting in person
E. Berlin, for the respondent/responding party

Keywords:Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Costs, Panel Review, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, section 7(5), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 61.13(3.1), Machado v. Ontario Hockey Association, 2019 ONCA 210, Hillmount Capital Inc. v. Pizale, 2021 ONCA 364

Nabrotzky v. Bell, 2026 ONCA 525

Sossin, Monahan and Osborne JJ.A.

Counsel:

K. Peacocke, for the appellant
E. Wargel, for the respondents

Keywords: Real Property, Adverse Possession

Bertucci v. Toronto Fashion Group Limited, 2026 ONCA 524

Sossin, Monahan and Osborne JJ.A.

Counsel:

M.A. Stephenson, for the appellant
M.J. Neirinck, for the respondents

Keywords: Conflict of Laws, Private International Law, Foreign Judgments, Recognition and Enforcement, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Discoverability, Limitations Act 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, s 13, Bertucci v. The Toronto Fashion Group Limited et al., 2024 ONSC 938

Ataei v. Kalantari, 2026 ONCA 523

Sossin, Monahan and Osborne JJ.A.

Counsel:

G. Joseph, for the appellant/respondent by way of cross-appeal
H. Niman and C. Van Wirdum, for the respondent/appellant by way of cross-appeal

Keywords: Family Law, Domestic Contracts, Separation Agreements, Setting Aside, Duress, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Costs, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s 56(4), Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, r 24(3), Davies v. Jane, 2025 ONCA 752, Brad-Jay Investments Ltd. v. Szijjarto (2006), 218 O.A.C. 315 (C.A.), Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9, Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867

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