COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (MAY 25 – MAY 29)

By John Polyzogopoulos on May 29, 2026

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Good afternoon.

Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of May 25, 2026.

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In The Law Society of Upper Canada v. Watson, the Court dismissed the LSO’s appeal from the Divisional Court’s decision to remit the matter back for a fresh determination of whether the LSO caused costs to be wasted under r. 25.01 of the Ontario Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division Rules of Practice and Procedure in a conduct application that was ultimately dismissed in its entirety. The Court held that the Hearing Division committed errors in principle by conducting its analysis in a piecemeal fashion and applying a higher standard of fault than what was required, rather than undertaking a holistic analysis of the LSO’s conduct from the beginning of the investigation through to its approach to disclosure during the hearing. The Court rejected the LSO’s call to import the extreme caution principle into the costs analysis, holding that the LSO had a dual mandate to both protect the public and to deal fairly with members whose livelihood and reputation were affected by such proceedings. The matter was remitted to a newly constituted panel with directions to conduct a holistic analysis of reasonableness and to consider whether a partial costs award is appropriate.

In Solmar Inc. v. Hall, the Court dismissed an appeal from the motion judge’s refusal to grant an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a $2 million defamation action. The action was brought by a developer against a retiree who, after a controversial rezoning approval, accused him of “corrupt and aggressive” business tactics in a Facebook post. Although the Court found errors in the motion judge’s fairness analysis and some of the judge’s findings on malice, it concluded there were still grounds to believe the claim had substantial merit. The Court found the defence of fair comment unsatisfactory, and the harm was serious enough to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression. However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs, reducing the award from $89,000 on a substantial indemnity basis to $40,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

In T.C.O. Agromart Ltd. v. Sutton Farms (Nacona) Ltd., the Court allowed the appeal from a trial judgment dismissing a negligence and occupiers’ liability claim arising from a bridge collapse. The Court found the trial judge erred by conflating causation with the standard of care, and by defining the duty to warn as limited to a warning to stay in the centre of the bridge rather than as requiring disclosure of the hidden danger posed by unsupported overhangs. The appeal was allowed and damages of $423,016.15 were awarded to the appellant.

In Yenovkian v. Shirtliff-Hinds Professional Corporation, the Court granted security for costs after finding the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to satisfy a costs award. The appeal was from a determination that the appellant had entered into a binding settlement with his former lawyers as to fees owing notwithstanding that the form of release had not been agreed to.

In Kininsberg v. Meerapfel, the Court dismissed the appeal from a motion judge’s decision that held that the Ontario court had jurisdiction over property claims arising from the parties’ separation and was an appropriate forum to hear those claims, notwithstanding that a Belgian court had also found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims.

In Metro Ontario Real Estate Limited v. Hillmond Investments Ltd. (Central Parkway Mall), the Court dismissed the landlord’s appeal, upholding the trial judge’s findings that the tenant was entitled to recover rent overpayments, the cost of replacing the roof, and improperly charged CAM expenses.

In Pilaszek v. SCIV Inc., the Court denied a motion to stay the enforcement of a mortgage pending appeal.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Civil Decisions

The Law Society of Upper Canada v. Watson, 2026 ONCA 372

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Discipline, Wasted Costs, Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, s. 41, s. 49.38(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 57.07(1), Ontario Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division Rules of Practice and Procedure, r. 14.05, r. 25.01, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Richard Keith Watson, 2013 ONLSHP 60, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Watson, 2014 ONLSTH 75, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Watson, 2015 ONLSTH 119, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Watson, 2015 ONLSTH 189, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Watson, 2016 ONLSTH 136, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Watson, 2016 ONLSTH 135, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Watson, 2016 ONLSTH 186, Watson v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 ONLSTA 3, Watson v. Law Society of Ontario, 2018 ONLSTA 14, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Speciale, [1994] L.S.D.D. No. 222, Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, Kuny v. College of Registered Nurses of Manitoba, 2017 MBCA 111, Ringrose v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Alberta), [1977] 1 S.C.R. 814, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9, Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.), Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, Galganov v. Russell (Township), 2012 ONCA 410, Marchand (Litigation Guardian of) v. Public General Hospital Society of Chatham (1998), 16 C.P.C. (4th) 201 (Ont. Gen. Div.), Rand Estate v. Lenton, 2009 ONCA 251, Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, W.D. Latimer Co. v. Bray (1974), 6 O.R. (2d) 129 (C.A.), Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2015 SCC 7, Lawyers & Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline (loose-leaf)

Solmar Inc. v. Hall, 2026 ONCA 367

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP, Civil Procedure, Costs, Leave to Appeal, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 137.1, Municipal Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 32, Sched, R. v. Granger, 2014 ONCJ 408, Hansman v. Neufeld, 2023 SCC 14, Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22, Hamer v. Jane Doe, 2024 ONCA 721, Bent v. Platnick, 2020 SCC 23, Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, Park Lawn Corporation v. Kahu Capital Partners Ltd., 2023 ONCA 129, Mondal v. Kirkconnell, 2023 ONCA 523, 40 Days for Life v. Dietrich, 2024 ONCA 599, Mantini v. Smith Lyons LLP (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 516, WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, 2008 SCC 40, 2110120 Ontario Inc. v. Buttar, 2023 ONCA 539, Nanda v. McEwan, 2020 ONCA 431, Marcellin v. London (City) Police Services Board, 2024 ONCA 468, Boys v. Star Printing and Publishing Co., [1927] 3 D.L.R. 847, Ross v. New Brunswick Teachers’ Association, 2001 NBCA 62, Lascaris v. B’nai Brith Canada, 2019 ONCA 163, Bondfield Construction Company Limited v. The Globe and Mail Inc., 2019 ONCA 166, United Soils v. Mohammed, 2017 ONSC 4450, 11 C.E.L.R. (4th) 216, Teneycke v. McVety, 2024 ONCA 927, Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3

T.C.O. Agromart Ltd. v. Sutton Farms (Nacona) Ltd., 2026 ONCA 371

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Occupier’s Liability, Duty of Care, Duty to Warn, Standard of Care, Factual Causation, Legal Causation, Occupiers’ Liability Act, R.S.O. 1990, c O.2, s. 3(1), Saadati v. Moorhead, 2017 SCC 28, Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., 2008 SCC 27, Walters v. Ontario, 2017 ONCA 53, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Nolet v. Fischer, 2020 ONCA 155, Waldick v. Malcolm (1990), 70 O.R. 2(d) 717 (C.A.), Waldick v. Malcolm, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 456, Alchimowicz v. Schram (1999), 116 O.A.C. 287, Lyng v. Ontario Place Corporation, 2024 ONCA 23, Kerr v. Loblaws Inc., 2007 ONCA 371, Winters v. Haldimand (County), 2015 ONCA 98, Campbell v. Bruce (County), 2016 ONCA 371, Woods v. Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources) (2003) 170 O.A.C. 88, Kennedy v. Waterloo County Board of Education (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), Epp v. Ridgetop Builders Ltd. (1978), 94 D.L.R. (3d) 505, Paul Porchak v. Pizza Pizza Limited, 2016 ONSC 4551, Clements v. Clements, 2012 SCC 32, Hemmings v. Peng, 2024 ONCA 318, Rankin (Rankin’s Garage & Sales) v. J.J., 2018 SCC 19, Campbell v. Bruce County (ONSC), 2015 ONSC 230

Yenovkian v. Shirtliff-Hinds Professional Corporation, 2026 ONCA 366

Keywords: Contracts, Solicitor-Client, Civil Procedure, Settlements, Enforcement, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Security for Costs, Frivolous and Vexatious, Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 57.07, 61.06(1)(a), Olivieri v. Sherman, 2007 ONCA 491, Grovum v. Kouznetsov, 2025 ONSC 3899, O.K. v. M.H., 2025 ONCA 352

Kininsberg v. Meerapfel, 2026 ONCA 373

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Forum non Conveniens, Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, Li v. Li, 2021 ONCA 669, Knowles v. Lindstrom, 2014 ONCA 116

Metro Ontario Real Estate Limited v. Hillmond Investments Ltd. (Central Parkway Mall), 2026 ONCA 370

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Enforcement, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Appeals, Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O 1990, c. L.15, s. 17(1), Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, Kaiman v. Graham, 2009 ONCA 77, Ontario Energy Savings L.P. v. 767269 Ontario Ltd., 2008 ONCA 350, Apotex Inc. v. Nordion (Canada) Inc., 2019 ONCA 23, McConnell v. Huxtable, 2014 ONCA 86, Shewchuk v. Blackmont Capital Inc., 2016 ONCA 912

Pilaszek v. SCIV Inc., 2026 ONCA 376

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Adjournments, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 20, r. 63.02(1)(b), RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, Zafar v. Saiyid, 2017 ONCA 919, Longley v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 ONCA 149, Sorrentino v. Certas Home and Auto Insurance Company, 2025 ONCA 835, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, Toronto Dominion Bank v. Hylton, 2012 ONCA 614, Bank of Montreal v. Abdel-Messih (2006), 148 A.C.W.S. (3d) 380 (Ont. C.A.), 2275518 Ontario Inc. v. The Toronto Dominion Bank, 2024 ONCA 343, Park v. Manulife Bank of Canada, 2025 ONCA 815, Morguard Residential v. Mandel, 2017 ONCA 177

Short Civil Decisions

Staples v. Jean, 2026 ONCA 369

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Interpretation, Hotchpot Clauses, Estate Trustees, Removal, Civil Procedure, Costs

Alyousef v. Alyousef, 2026 ONCA 374

Keywords: Contracts, Corporations, Partnerships, Damages, Net After-Tax Profit, Alyousef v. Alyousef, 2026 ONCA 78, Alyousef v. Alyousef, 2026 ONCA 280

Ali v. Harris, 2026 ONCA 375

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Accountants, Civil Procedure, Abuse of Process, Frivolous and Vexatious, Self-Represented Litigants

CIVIL DECISIONS

The Law Society of Upper Canada v. Watson, 2026 ONCA 372

[Tulloch C.J.O., Sossin J.A. and O’Marra JJ.A. (ad hoc)]

Counsel:

S. Aylward and A. Heine, for the appellant

D. Moore, K. Jones and C. Stienburg, for the respondent

facts:

This matter was about the threshold requirement for an award of wasted costs against the appellant, the Law Society of Ontario (the “LSO”), in a conduct application. The respondent, R.K.W., was subject to a lengthy investigation and disciplinary hearing. At the end of the hearing, counsel for the LSO sought to withdraw the application, and, ultimately, the application was dismissed in its entirety. R.K.W. then sought costs against the LSO. The Hearing Division of the Law Society Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) held that, applying the Tribunal’s rule governing costs against the LSO, costs were not warranted. This finding was upheld by the Tribunal’s Appeal Division. The Divisional Court allowed the appeal from the Appeal Division in part, concluding that the Tribunal had erred in finding R.K.W was not eligible for costs under r. 25.01(1)(a)(ii) dealing with “wasted costs”. The Divisional Court further held that the LSO’s process was procedurally unfair and one-sided and remitted the matter back to the Hearing Division for a fresh determination of the costs issue.

issues:

1. When may costs be ordered against the LSO for “wasted costs”?

2. Did any of the alleged errors affect the outcome?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. The Court held that r. 25.01 established two branches under which costs may be awarded against the Law Society. The first branch deals with whether the proceeding was unwarranted. The second branch deals with whether the Society caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other default. The Court clarified that while the first and second branches addressed pre-hearing and in-hearing conduct respectively, the two branches were not silos, and the LSO’s conduct during the investigation could and should be considered as a contextual factor in determining whether costs were wasted under the second branch. The Court further held that the Divisional Court’s analysis of the LSO’s conduct through the lens of the duty of procedural fairness was not the operative legal framework on this costs appeal, as this was a statutory appeal of a costs decision and no party challenged the validity of the decision on procedural fairness grounds.

The Court concluded that the application of the second branch required a holistic analysis of the specific steps taken both individually, and viewed as a whole, in the context of the case, rather than considering each step in the investigation or prosecution in isolation. The Court held that where the LSO’s actions or inactions were negligent or led to undue delay, regardless of the LSO’s actual intent, wasted costs may result, and that the LSO may be liable for costs irrespective of the outcome of the proceedings.

The Court rejected the LSO’s call to import the extreme caution principle from the civil context into the costs analysis under r. 25.01. The Court held that the role of a lawyer in a civil proceeding and the role of the LSO in a disciplinary proceeding were not the same, and that the LSO had a dual mandate to both protect the public and to deal fairly with members whose livelihood and reputation were affected by such proceedings. The Court concluded that to import the extreme caution principle into the text would be to downplay the LSO’s responsibilities to its members, and that the balancing of the objectives of r. 25.01(1)(a) differed from that balancing under r. 57.07(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. No. The Court found that the Hearing Division committed errors in principle in its application of r. 25.01 by conducting the analysis in a piecemeal fashion and applying a higher standard of fault than what was required. The Hearing Division failed to consider holistically whether the LSO took a one-sided approach to its investigation and prosecution of R.K.W. The Court agreed that statements by LSO counsel, the timing of the investigator’s final report before interviewing R.K.W, the failure to conduct a corporate search, and the characterization of the case as a contest of credibility all pointed to the inherently flawed nature of the investigation.

With respect to the first branch of r. 25.01, the Court concluded that the Hearing Division’s finding that the proceedings were not unwarranted was entitled to deference, as it was a rational conclusion rooted in an assessment of the whole of the evidence and revealing no palpable and overriding error. However, the Court agreed with the Divisional Court that the Hearing Division committed a legal error in its findings on the second branch, and that this error infected the whole of its reasoning on the issue of costs caused by delay or other default.

On the second branch, the Court concluded that the Hearing Division’s interpretation of Feldman was overly rigid, erroneously requiring that legal positions taken must be without any chance of success or that procedural misconduct was necessary. The Court held that a pattern of taking defensible but unsuccessful positions on disclosure issues, reflecting a one-sided investigation or a misunderstanding of the LSO’s role, could well meet the threshold for wasted costs. It further held that costs were not an “all or nothing” proposition and that the determination of whether costs were in fact wasted must be reassessed, including costs wasted on fighting about disclosure that should have been provided and costs caused by delays from the failure to make timely disclosure.

The Court concluded that the Divisional Court was correct to set aside the Tribunal’s decision that no costs were wasted in R.K.W.’s case. Given the disagreement with the Divisional Court’s use of procedural fairness and the additional guidance provided on the interpretation of r. 25.01, the Court substituted directions to the new hearing panel in place of the Divisional Court’s directions. The Court directed that a holistic analysis of reasonableness should be conducted, requiring an assessment of the LSO’s conduct and its approach to its role from the beginning of the investigation, and that the new hearing panel should consider whether the LSO correctly understood its public interest mandate to treat its members fairly. The Court held that if the new hearing panel does not grant the costs award in its entirety, it must consider whether a partial costs award is appropriate, and that if costs of the conduct proceedings are awarded, the panel should also revisit the finding that R.K.W. should receive no costs in relation to the abortive first costs hearing. The Court would not disturb the Divisional Court’s order that R.K.W. was entitled to costs before the Appeal Division Panel.

Solmar Inc. v. Hall, 2026 ONCA 367

[Fairburn A.C.J.O., Simmons and Coroza JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. Gilliland and M. Robson, for the appellant

W.C. McDowell and D. Knoke, for the respondents

facts

S.H., the appellant, was a retiree who lived in Niagara-on-the-Lake (“NOTL”). B.M. was a successful developer. In October 2022, a company owned by B.M. acquired a large property in the heritage district, the former site of Parliament Oak public school. In February 2023, B.M., through his company, brought an application to amend the town’s official plan and zoning by-law to enable the development of a four-story luxury hotel. The project was a matter of local controversy.

Weeks after the rezoning application was filed, B.M. met with NOTL town Councillor G.B. for lunch. During lunch, B.M. gave Councillor G.B. an envelope containing $10,000 in cash, saying it was a contribution for his campaign. The next day, Councillor G.B. called B.M. to say he could not accept the $10,000 because it did not qualify as a legitimate political contribution under the Municipal Elections Act, 1996. Councillor G.B. then handed the cash to NOTL town staff. The matter was referred to the town’s Integrity Commissioner, who determined in September 2023 that no further action would be taken, and to the police, who conducted their own investigation and did not lay any charges.

On June 25, 2024, the NOTL Council voted on the rezoning of Parliament Oak, and the application passed 5-4. Councillor G.B. voted against the application.

The next day, on June 26, 2024, S.H. read in the news that the Council had approved the rezoning and posted it in a community Facebook group. In his post, S.H. described the zoning approval as a “travesty” and accused B.M.’s company of being “corrupt and aggressive” in its business tactics. He directed readers to Google search terms related to B.M.’s past controversies in Caledon.

S.H. received a libel notice from B.M.’s lawyers and declined to apologize. Subsequently, B.M. and his development company sued S.H. for defamation, seeking $2 million in damages.

Decision Below

S.H. brought a motion pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (“CJA”), seeking to have the defamation action dismissed as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (“SLAPP”).

The motion judge dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion and allowed the defamation action to proceed. B.M. conceded that the post related to a matter of public interest. However, the motion judge concluded that: (1) there were grounds to believe that the defamation claim had substantial merit; (2) there were grounds to believe that S.H. did not have a valid defence; and (3) the harm suffered or likely to be suffered as a result of the impugned expression was sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting S.H.’s expression.

The motion judge attributed the following meaning to the expression: “[a]ny fair reading of the Defendant’s Facebook messages would conclude that they convey that the Plaintiff is an aggressive and corrupt developer who has a history of bribing public officials, and that any officials who approve one of his proposed developments must have been intimidated or bribed.” The motion judge also ordered S.H. to pay costs on a substantial indemnity basis for $89,000.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err in assessing the meaning of the comments by (1) taking into account subjective intention instead of considering the comments’ objective meaning, and (2) ignoring the mode of publication?

2. Did the motion judge err in (1) assessing the “fairness” of S.H.’s comments, and (2) finding that there are grounds to believe that the comments were actuated by malice?

3. Did the motion judge err in his balancing exercise of the harm caused?

4. Did the motion judge depart from the presumption on the basis of malice in assessing the cost award?

holding:

Appeal allowed in part.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court found no reversible error in the motion judge’s assessment of meaning. On the first sub-issue, S.H. submitted that the motion judge erred by considering his “intent” instead of focusing on the objective meaning of the words. The Court rejected this. The reference to “intent” and S.H.’s cross-examination evidence must be understood in context. In the background section, the motion judge mentioned the “intent” of the impugned words but then immediately commented on the expression’s thrust “as a whole and in context.” In his analysis, the motion judge applied an objective test, finding that “any fair reading” of the post conveyed that B.M. was “an aggressive and corrupt developer who has a history of bribing public officials.” Reading the reasons as a whole, the motion judge correctly applied an objective test. By referring to S.H.’s cross-examination and “intent,” the motion judge was simply pointing out that not even S.H. accepted the meaning he urged the Court to adopt.

On the second sub-issue, S.H. submitted that the motion judge failed to consider “the conversational nature” of Facebook, where expression is not always precise. The Court disagreed. The fact that the comments were made on social media was “front and centre” in the case. The motion judge stated he did not pick the words apart “phrase by phrase” and rejected a literal interpretation, instead reading the questions as veiled accusations and commenting that to do otherwise would “understate the intelligence of the reader.” Later, in discussing the fair comment defence, the motion judge noted that “one must in evaluating a text like the Facebook posts allow some latitude for the author to extrapolate from facts in expressing his opinion.” Accordingly, S.H. had not pointed to any reversible errors, and without error, there was no basis to interfere with the motion judge’s finding on meaning.

2. Yes, in part, but the errors were not dispositive. On the first sub-issue, the Court accepted that the motion judge erred in assessing fairness rather than focusing on whether the comments were objectively incapable of belief. The motion judge agreed with B.M. that “a fair-minded person could not honestly express the views” in S.H.’s Facebook post based on the Google sources it relied on. However, it was well established that the fairness of a comment, its reasonableness and proportionality, should not be considered in applying the objective test, and the Supreme Court in WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson advised against referring to the “fair-minded person” in that assessment.

Considering the matter afresh, the Court concluded there were grounds to believe S.H. had no valid defence. The defence of fair comment applies only to statements of comment, not statements of fact; if the statements are factual, the defence is unavailable. The expression suggested that B.M. was an aggressive and corrupt developer with a history of bribing public officials. The Court found grounds to believe that a reasonable trier of fact could view the statements suggesting bribery as factual assertions, and, if so, the fair comment defence would fail. On this basis alone, there was ground to believe no valid defence existed.

On the second sub-issue regarding malice, the Court did not endorse all of the motion judge’s analysis but was satisfied there was a basis in fact and law to find malice.

On recklessness, the Court found it went too far to say that S.H. “did not read the articles” before posting, since his unchallenged evidence showed he had Googled and read the referenced articles. Even on his own evidence, S.H. made allegations beyond what he had read. None of the articles stated that B.M. or his company were ever charged with or convicted of bribery. There were no reported allegations of attempts to bribe an elected official before the incident with Councillor G.B.

In cross-examination, S.H. admitted he did not “mean to imply that [B.M.] had been bribing people for decades” and conceded that “[t]here is no evidence that he has ever bribed anybody,” other than, in his view, Councillor G.B.

On ulterior motive and desire to harm, the Court agreed that even if S.H. did not concede an improper purpose, there was a basis in the record, namely the content and timing of the Facebook post, on which the motion judge could conclude S.H. had an improper motive to injure the plaintiff. Although it was legitimate to criticize a development proposal and raise concerns about the integrity of the approval process, the post and reply comments went further. They could be read as a “direct attack on [B.M.’s] character,” indicating a desire to harm him.

On intentional dishonesty, however, the Court found the motion judge’s basis misplaced, as the alleged dishonesty about councillors being corrupt related to malice against the councillors, who were not parties, and not to malice toward B.M.

3. No. The Court upheld the motion judge’s balancing analysis under s. 137.1(4)(b). The motion judge found that B.M.’s development proposal would require further planning approvals and future votes at NOTL Council. He inferred that the accusations against B.M. and the aspersions cast at councillors could influence their thinking about future votes. The Court held that the motion judge’s inference that a significant percentage of the community would have seen or been referred to the post was not a palpable and overriding error, given the public Facebook group’s 3,100 members in a town of only 19,000. Regarding the inference that the post could influence NOTL councillors in future votes, the Court noted the vote on the first proposal was a close 5-4, and there was considerable public scrutiny. Those same councillors would vote on future proposals by B.M. Concerning other potential sources of harm to B.M.’s reputation, the Court found that causation was not an all-or-nothing proposition and that the post could affect future approvals.

The Court also considered the SLAPP indicia raised by S.H., including B.M.’s history of pursuing litigation, the financial and power imbalance, evidence of retributory intent, and the absence of harm. The Court agreed that, on the record, there was a basis to say there was a clear disparity in wealth between B.M. and S.H. However, even accepting the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error in finding an equal playing field, the Court was not persuaded that there was a basis to interfere with his conclusion that “what is really going on” was that B.M. was seeking to vindicate a legitimate concern about reputational harm in the face of gratuitous personal attacks. The motion judge’s finding that there was no bad faith was entitled to deference.

4. Yes, in part. Section 137.1(8) of the CJA presumes that a successful responding party to an anti-SLAPP motion is not entitled to costs. The motion judge departed from this presumption based on malice and ordered S.H. to pay costs on a substantial indemnity basis of $89,000. The Court found that the expression “may have been motivated by malice” was sufficient to rebut the presumption, and that the record supported a finding of malice based on recklessness and a desire to harm. However, the motion judge awarded costs on a substantial indemnity scale without reasons. Such costs are warranted only where there has been “reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous” conduct. The Court concluded that S.H.’s conduct did not amount to such conduct. Accordingly, the Court granted leave to appeal costs, set aside the costs award, and substituted an award of $40,000 on a partial indemnity basis, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

T.C.O. Agromart Ltd. v. Sutton Farms (Nacona) Ltd., 2026 ONCA 371

[Gillese, Coroza and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Rachlin and T. Kasi, for the appellant
R. S. Baldwin, for the respondent

facts

The appellant, T.C.O. Agromart Ltd. (“T.C.O. Agromart”), provided crop spraying services to farms. The respondent, Sutton Farms (Nacona) Ltd. (“Sutton Farms”), operated a family farm near Napanee, Ontario with dairy cattle and cash crops on farmland of approximately 1,450 acres. The farm included fields used for crop farming on both sides of the Napanee River. In the early 1900s, the owners of the farm constructed a bridge over the river for convenient access across the river. As found by the trial judge, the bridge was used to transport heavy farm equipment and heavy loads between the north and south fields of the farm. The bridge was used multiple times every day, particularly during harvest season.

The owners rebuilt the bridge in 1980. The reconstruction included the placement of concrete abutments on either side of the bridge which anchored five steel beams spanning the river. The steel beams were spaced such that the total width of the steel beams was ten feet, centred on the bridge. Wood decking was placed over the steel beams along the full length of the bridge (fifty-seven feet). It was sixteen feet wide. That meant a three-foot width of wooden deck extended beyond the outermost steel beam on each side. There was no structural support below that three foot overhang on either side.

As it had done for approximately twenty years, the respondent hired the appellant to spray herbicides on the corn fields on both sides of the river. The employee of the appellant assigned to the work, Mr. Denyes, was driving a crop sprayer across the bridge to access the crop fields on the other side when the bridge gave way and the sprayer fell off the bridge landing in the river. The driver was initially trapped underwater in the sprayer but fortunately escaped without serious injuries. The sprayer, however, was badly damaged. The appellant’s insurer brought this action to recover from the respondent the amounts it had paid out to the appellant.

The hidden danger lay in the fact that the bridge was sixteen feet wide, but only the centre ten feet were supported by steel beams. The outer three feet on either side were unsupported. It was common ground at trial that there was no warning of any kind given, either by way of signage posted at the bridge or by way of direct communications to the appellant or its driver. Mr. S, the owner and occupier of the property, testified that he and members of his family were aware of the unsupported overhang on either side of the bridge; that it would be unsafe to drive too far to the right or left; and that when he and members of his family were using wide equipment, they would use an alternate bridge approximately five hundred metres away. Mr. S conceded, however, that no employees of the appellant were ever expressly prohibited from using the bridge, nor were they warned about the unsupported overhang.

The trial judge determined that the accident was caused by the driver’s negligence, rather than the design, maintenance or upkeep of the bridge. The trial judge viewed causation as the critical issue at trial, and accordingly, assumed without deciding that the first three elements of the test had been met. She found that a reasonable person in the respondent’s position would not reasonably foresee that the driver would inadvertently let the sprayer veer to the right over the overhang. The trial judge then concluded that the factual and legal causes of the accident were not related to the design, maintenance or upkeep of the bridge, with the result that the respondent did not breach the standard of care owed pursuant to s. 3(1) of the OLA. Accordingly, the trial judge dismissed the action with costs, but fixed damages to be awarded in the event of a finding of liability in the total amount of $423,016.15.

issue:

1. Whether the trial court erred by failing to make findings with respect to the standard of care.

2. Whether the trial court erred in defining the duty to warn.

3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the duty to warn was not a factual or legal cause of the accident.

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

1. Yes. The standard of care in negligence actions involving occupiers is one of reasonableness in the circumstances, as established in Kerr. The application of the standard of care is a question of mixed fact and law, as per Walters v. Ontario. Subsection 3(1) OLA requires occupiers to keep their premises “reasonably safe,” as affirmed in Waldick v. Malcolm.

The trial judge erred by using causation as a proxy for the standard of care. Once she determined that the presence of signage would not have prevented the accident, she concluded that signage was not required to meet the standard of care and therefore that there was no breach of that standard. However, a lack of causation in one particular case does not mean there was no breach of the standard of care. The focus of the standard of care analysis must be on the conduct of the bridge owner and the duty owed to all users of the bridge. Using causation as a proxy for the standard of care improperly uses the conduct of one particular party to determine the scope of the bridge owner’s general duty owed to all users.

The respondent was an occupier of premises to whom s. 3 of the OLA applied, and therefore owed a duty to keep its premises “reasonably safe.” The evidence was clear that the respondent took no steps to warn the appellant or anyone entering on the premises of the risk that the outer three feet of the bridge on either side were unsupported and unsafe for wide equipment. It follows that the respondent breached its duty under s. 3(1) of the OLA.

2. Yes. While there is no duty on an occupier to warn of obvious and self-evident dangers, the danger in this case, the unsupported outer three feet on either side of the bridge, was a hidden danger, not a plain and obvious one. The cases cited by the trial judge were distinguishable because in those cases the danger was plain and obvious and therefore no warning could be expected or required of the occupier. Because of the hidden danger here, an appropriate duty to warn arose.

The trial judge erred by concluding that the duty to warn was limited to a warning to stay in the centre of the bridge. The appeal judge agreed that a warning to Mr. D to stay in the centre of the bridge was not relevant, as Mr. D already knew and understood this as a matter of common sense. However, in the circumstances of this case, the duty to warn necessarily included the disclosure of the hidden danger that lurked beneath — the fact that the outer three feet on either side of the bridge were completely unsupported by the steel beams below.

Absent an adequate warning, the appellant and its employees lacked the requisite knowledge to make an informed decision about whether to accept the risks of crossing the bridge with the sprayer. The standard of care imposed on an occupier by s. 3(1) of the OLA in the particular circumstances of this case required such a warning, and since the respondent took no steps to provide it, the respondent breached its duty to warn and its duty to keep its premises reasonably safe.

3. Yes. Factual causation: The trial judge concluded that warnings would not have prevented the accident because the driver already knew he had to stay in the centre of the bridge. However, this conclusion became incorrect when the duty to warn is properly defined as including a warning that the outer three feet on either side were completely unsupported. Had the driver been warned of this hidden danger, it would have impacted his decision to cross the bridge with the sprayer in the manner that he did. Factual causation was therefore established.

Legal causation: The accident was both reasonably foreseeable and was in fact foreseen. The owner and occupier of the property, Mr. S, was aware of the hidden overhang danger and associated risks and elected to use an alternative bridge when using wide equipment. Even if experienced drivers knew as a matter of common sense to keep their vehicles centred, it was nonetheless foreseeable that one driving heavy farm equipment might veer slightly onto the unsupported overhang, risking an accident such as the one that occurred. The absence of previous incidents on the bridge did not negate the foreseeability of the risk or the respondent’s duty to take precautions against such harm.

Yenovkian v. Shirtliff-Hinds Professional Corporation, 2026 ONCA 366

[Thorburn J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

R.B. Macdonald, for the moving party S.H. Professional Corporation

V.Y., acting in person

J.M., appearing as amicus curiae

facts

VY retained SHPC to act for him in a family law proceeding. He sought temporary sole custody of his two children with him in Ontario and opposed his former spouse’s request that she be permitted to move to England with the children. His motion was dismissed, as the motion judge determined that despite VY’s representations to the court, he did not reside in Ontario. SHPC terminated the retainer shortly after the motion decision, noting that VY misled SHPC.

VY obtained an order for assessment of his fees under the Solicitors Act. On the date the assessment was scheduled to proceed the parties reached a settlement agreement. Later on, VY objected to the confidentiality provision in the draft release and SHPC agreed to remove it. VY’s counsel wrote back, indicating that his client was still not prepared to accept the terms of the release and would therefore not be signing it. The court directed that a case conference be scheduled to address the enforcement of the settlement. The case conference judge issued an order enforcing the terms of settlement with reasons explaining that a settlement was reached and that disagreement as to the form of release was not a valid defence to a settlement. VY subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal.

SHPC sought an order pursuant to r. 61.06(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, that VY post security for costs as there was good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that VY, who was not resident in Ontario, lacked sufficient assets to pay the costs of the appeal. VY submitted that the requested order was unnecessary and would effectively deprive him of the ability to continue his appeal. He also sought an order under r. 57.07 sanctioning the conduct of RBM, SHPC’s lawyer.

issues:

1. Was the appeal frivolous and vexatious?

2. Did VY lack sufficient assets in Ontario?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. Yes. The Court concluded that the appeal was both frivolous and vexatious. A settlement was binding even if the form of release was not settled unless the agreement provided otherwise. VY’s subsequent insistence on removing the confidentiality provision in the release was not a condition of the settlement agreement, and in any event, SHPC agreed to remove it. VY was advised by the court in advance of the case conference that the reason for the case conference was to decide the merits without a further hearing. He had notice that a substantive order could be issued. Moreover, despite the settlement, VY had brought an action against SHPC in Nevada, which also named the trial judge in the underlying family law proceeding. VY continued to reject requests to demonstrate that he had assets in Ontario sufficient to satisfy a cost award. The Court also noted VY’s request that RBM be subject to a r. 57.07 order for bringing the motion was wholly unreasonable.

2. Yes. The Court was satisfied that VY did not reside in Ontario and had not demonstrated that he had assets in Ontario to satisfy the moving party’s costs if the appeal was unsuccessful. There was no dispute that VY lived in Nevada and had previously claimed to have no income. Moreover, despite repeated requests from SHPC, he had failed to meet his onus to demonstrate that he had assets in the province of Ontario. If SHPC was awarded costs, it would be extremely difficult to collect those costs as not only did VY reside in Nevada, but he had been known to use several aliases in court proceedings making enforcement in Nevada very difficult if not impractical.

Kininsberg v. Meerapfel, 2026 ONCA 373

[Favreau, Copeland and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

ADD HERE

N. M. Rouleau, for the appellant

S. Codas and S. Strathopolous, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Forum non Conveniens, Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, Li v. Li, 2021 ONCA 669, Knowles v. Lindstrom, 2014 ONCA 116

facts

The parties were married in Belgium on August 31, 2006. J.M. is of Belgian origin. K.K. holds Brazilian and Luxembourgish nationality. Eight days before their marriage, the parties signed a marriage contract before a notary in Belgium. Article 1 of the contract stipulates that:

The future spouses adopt the regime of separation of property as provided for in the Belgian Civil Code. Consequently, each spouse shall retain ownership of all their property, dispose of it and administer it freely.

The parties have two children. The children were born in Belgium in 2009 and 2013. The parties moved to Ontario in 2018 and separated approximately two months later. The appellant, J.M., commenced divorce proceedings in Belgium. The respondent, K.K., commenced divorce proceedings in Ontario. The Brussels Court of Appeal decided that it did not have jurisdiction over certain aspects of the parties’ separation, including their divorce, but that it had jurisdiction over the “liquidation of the matrimonial regime.”

Following this decision, J.M. brought a motion to challenge the jurisdiction of the Ontario court over the property claims and to argue that, even if the Ontario court had jurisdiction, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, Belgium was the clearly more appropriate forum to decide this issue. The motion judge dismissed the motion. The motion judge was satisfied that the Ontario court had jurisdiction over the property claims and that J.M. had not demonstrated that Belgium was the clearly more appropriate forum.

issue:

1. Did the motion judge err by failing to recognize the judgment of the Brussels Court of Appeal?

2. Did the motion judge err in concluding that the Ontario court has jurisdiction over the property claims and did she err in exercising that jurisdiction?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court outlined that she correctly began her analysis by stating that the purpose of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is focused on the circumstances of the case, and its objective is to ensure that both parties are treated fairly and that the resolution process is efficient. The motion judge considered several well-established factors in her application of the doctrine, exercised her discretion reasonably and committed no error in principle in identifying or applying them.

J.M. took particular issue with the first factor considered by the motion judge, namely the multiplicity of proceedings and the risk of contradictory decisions. J.M’s argument was that the motion judge erred in deciding that, if the Ontario court exercises its jurisdiction over the equalization of property, the parties will be able to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings. The Court did not agree that the motion judge committed such an error. In fact, the motion judge directly addressed the question. It was incumbent upon the motion judge to weigh several factors, and this is what she did. J.M. had identified no error in principle, significant error in the interpretation of the evidence, or unreasonable exercise of discretion that would justify overturning the judgment.

2. No. First, J.M. argued that the motion judge erred because she did not recognize the decision of the Brussels Court of Appeal. He suggested that this decision determined that the Belgian courts must decide the question of the liquidation of the matrimonial regime and that comity between the Ontario court and the Belgian court required that the Ontario court recognize and respect this decision. The Court rejected this argument. Even if the Belgian court decided that it had jurisdiction over the liquidation of the matrimonial regime, this did not mean that it decided that Ontario did not have jurisdiction and that Belgium was the clearly more appropriate forum to decide this question.

Second, J.M. argued that the motion judge erred in deciding that the Ontario court had jurisdiction to decide the property claims in this matter. The Court disagreed. The motion judge properly identified the presumptive connecting factors that create a link between the subject-matter of a dispute and Ontario her conclusion that the Ontario court has jurisdiction was therefore supported.

Metro Ontario Real Estate Limited v. Hillmond Investments Ltd. (Central Parkway Mall), 2026 ONCA 370

[Gillese, Coroza and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.L. Solmon and J.P. McReynolds, for the moving party/appellant

L. Galessiere, for the responding parties/respondents

facts

This appeal arose from a commercial lease executed in December 1978 (the “Lease”). The Tenant sued the Landlord for, among other things: (1) overpayment of rent during the lease extension periods from 2003 to 2023; (2) the cost of replacing the roof over the leased premises; and (3) overpayment of common area maintenance (“CAM”) charges.

The first claim arose in 2008, when the Tenant repeatedly complained to the Landlord about the frequency and severity of the roof leaks over the lease premises. The Landlord acknowledged the roof was old, had suffered leaks over the past year, and that the Tenant’s anticipated store renovation in 2009 would be the appropriate time to do a complete roof replacement. In June 2009, the Landlord accepted that it had responsibility to repair the roof but rejected responsibility for replacement, contrary to what it had agreed to in 2008. At the end of August 2009, the Landlord took the position that it was responsible for neither replacing nor repairing the roof. The Tenant ultimately replaced the roof before it renovated the interior space, while continuing to assert that the cost of replacement should be borne by the Landlord.

The second claim arose in 2009, when the Tenant disputed the amount of additional rent it had paid the Landlord from the start of the second renewal period of the Lease in 2003 to the end of the Lease in 2023. The Tenant maintained that s. 38 of the Lease modified the calculation of percentage rent. The Landlord took the position that the calculation of “percentage rent” was not amended by s. 38. In effect, its position was that s. 38 created a new type of rent, “premium rent”, which the Tenant had to pay in addition to the existing percentage rent.

The third claim arose from the Tenant’s contention that the Landlord had overcharged it for its share of the CAM charges. In its pleading amended March 1, 2019, for the first time, the Landlord claimed for unpaid CAM charges for the years 2009-2011. It claimed at trial that because it did not invoice the Tenant for those charges until 2013, the six-year limitation period in s. 17(1) of the Real Property Limitations Act (“RPLA”), did not start to run until 2013. The trial judge found in favour of the Tenant on all three claims.

issues:

1. Did the trial judge err in his interpretation of the Lease with regard to the calculation of additional rent?

2. Did the trial judge err in finding the Tenant had the right to replace the roof of the lease premises at the Landlord’s expense?

3. Did the trial judge err in finding the Landlord’s claim for underpaid CAM charges for the years 2009-11 was statute-barred?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court found no error in the trial judge’s interpretation of how additional rent was to be calculated during the renewal periods. There was no basis for the Landlord’s contention that the parties interpreted s. 38 in the same way. The Landlord’s witness conceded in cross-examination that the Landlord conceived of its new interpretation of s. 38 after the litigation commenced. And the trial judge found the Tenant’s conduct in respect of historical rent payments was ambiguous or equivocal.

The Court further rejected the Landlord’s argument that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the Limitations Act, 2002. The Tenant first noted the error in 2009, immediately before it started the action, and the Landlord kept the overpayments, without juristic reason. The limitation period began to run when the Landlord retained each overpayment. The trial judge made no error in finding that the Tenant was entitled to damages for unjust enrichment for the two-year period prior to the date the action commenced.

The Court further rejected the Landlord’s argument that the trial judge erred in his interpretation of how additional rent was to be calculated by failing to apply the adverse inference principle. The trial judge explained why he refused to draw adverse inferences from the Tenant’s failure to call certain people as witnesses. The trial judge’s reasons were a full answer to the Landlord’s complaint and the Court found nothing in them that attracted appellate interference. Furthermore, the trial judge addressed the “rent paid” theory in his Supplementary Reasons, contrary to the Landlord’s argument that it had not been considered. There was no need to repeat that reasoning as it was sound and the Landlord led no evidence to support it.

2. No. The Court found no error in the trial judge’s determination that the Tenant had the right to replace the roof over the lease premises at the Landlord’s expense. There was no ambiguity in s. 10 of the Lease. Section 9 of the Lease placed responsibility for the maintenance of the interior of the lease premises on the Tenant, and properly interpreted, s. 10 of the Lease placed responsibility for repairs and replacement of the exterior of the lease premises on the Landlord.

Further, the Court rejected the Landlord’s argument that the trial judge erred in finding the Tenant had proved its claim for damages related to the roof replacement despite having failed to lead admissible documentary evidence in support of it. The Landlord not only did not raise this issue at trial, but it also consented to the admission into evidence of the document briefs that contained the Tenant’s damages documentation. Further, and in any event, the Tenant’s evidence regarding damages for the roof replacement was also tendered through the testimony of two of its witnesses.

Finally, the Court rejected the Landlord’s argument that the trial judge erred in failing to consider the parties’ subsequent conduct in interpreting the Lease. That the allegation failed because the trial judge did not err in finding that s. 10 was unambiguous. The subsequent conduct of parties to a Lease should be considered only if the Lease remained ambiguous after considering the text and its factual matrix. As the trial judge made no error in finding the relevant terms of the Lease unambiguous, there was no reason for him to consider the parties’ subsequent conduct.

3. No. The trial judge did not err in finding that the Landlord’s claim for the period from 2009 to 2011 was statue-barred under the RPLA. The Court concluded that the Landlord had not established any of the foundational points on which its submission rested. First, the Landlord had not pointed the Court to a provision in the Lease which stated that CAM charges were not actionable until billed. Second, the Court saw nothing in s. 22 of the Lease relied on by the Landlord which addressed what was to happen when the Landlord failed to comply with its obligations created under that provision. Third, if there was a term in the Lease specifying a contractual interest rate for a breach of s. 22, the Landlord failed to identify it.

Pilaszek v. SCIV Inc., 2026 ONCA 376

[Thorburn J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

P.P., acting in person

A.H. Boghossian, for the responding party, SCIV Inc.

J.M., appearing as amicus curiae

facts

On April 12, 2023, SCIV Inc. (“SCIV”) registered a one-year mortgage loan of $130,000 with an 11.5% annual interest rate on P.P.’s property (the “Charge”). P.P. defaulted on the Charge on March 12, 2024. The Charge matured on April 12, 2024, and no renewal, amendment or extension of the Charge was offered.

On April 26, 2024, SCIV’s solicitors served P.P. with a notice of sale under mortgage and notice of intention to enforce security. On June 4, 2024, SCIV issued its statement of claim. After the exchange of pleadings, SCIV brought a motion for summary judgment.

On March 13, 2026, P.P served the respondent’s counsel with her affidavit and a document titled “Defendant’s Factum” wherein she stated that she did not intend to rely on any of the material previously filed by her then-counsel and intended to represent herself. She also filed a notice of intention to act in person. At the return of the motion, P.P. sought an adjournment because she was now representing herself. The adjournment was denied.

P.P. argued that summary judgment was inappropriate as she was a victim of fraud, and a full trial was required to address conflicting accounts of the loan transaction. Assuming there was a fraud, the motion judge found that P.P. offered no evidence that SCIV was in any way associated with the alleged fraud. The motion judge granted SCIV’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed P.P.’s counterclaim. Pursuant to the judgment, the court ordered that P.P. pay the amounts owing to SCIV and deliver possession of the property.

On appeal, P.P. claimed the motion judge failed to consider and address her affidavit evidence, improperly weighed evidence and made findings of credibility on a paper record, erred in dismissing her counterclaim, and breached the principles of procedural fairness by denying her request for an adjournment and awarding full indemnity costs.

issue:

Should the enforcement of the judgment and the writ of possession be stayed pending appeal?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court applied the well-known RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) test for interlocutory injunctions to the question of whether the stay should be granted.

No Serious Issue

The Court disagreed that the amount owing was a serious issue, and that the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment without a full evidentiary record on the amount owing. P.P. did not dispute the amount proposed by SCIV at the motion the judgment amount was supported by the evidence.

The Court also disagreed with P.P.’s claim that the motion judge improperly weighed the evidence and failed to consider “allegations of fraud and misrepresentation connected to the loan transaction.” The motion judge considered the allegations but held that “[n]one of these allegations are supported by any proper evidence”.

Nor was there a breach of procedural fairness in denying P.P.’s request for an adjournment. The motion judge refused the adjournment on the basis that the matter had been outstanding for 18 months, and the mortgage was outstanding since April 12, 2024. Various SCIV representatives received threats during this period. Examinations were completed, materials filed, and P.P. decided to terminate her lawyer’s services one week before the motion. Moreover, there was no evidence that the denial of her adjournment request led to a miscarriage of justice.

Lastly, the motion judge properly exercised her discretion and ordered costs to be paid on a full indemnity basis.

No Irreparable Harm

P.P acknowledged, with the benefit of independent legal counsel, SCIV’s entitlement to take possession of and sell the property in the event of default. A chargor cannot contractually accept the consequence of default and then invoke that same consequence as irreparable harm to forestall enforcement.

Furthermore, aside from asserting that she will lose access to the property, P.P. had not adduced any evidence of permanent and non-compensable harm. The Court agreed that the loss of possession upon default is a “bargained-for remedy” that P.P. accepted under the Charge. Treating that consequence as irreparable harm, without more, would effectively allow a moving party to satisfy the irreparable harm element in virtually every residential mortgage enforcement proceeding. This would be inconsistent with the borrower’s agreement that the lender may take enforcement steps upon default.

Balance of Convenience

The Court found that the balance of convenience favoured SCIV. SCIV has not had the benefit of its security for almost two years. A stay would extend that deprivation and its recovery depended on the proceeds of sale of this asset.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Staples v Jean, 2026 ONCA 369

[Copeland, Monahan and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Figliomeni and T. Rynard, for the appellants

A. V. Mayeski and K. J. Hagman, for the respondent JKH

P. Askew for the respondent, TJ

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Interpretation, Hotchpot Clauses, Estate Trustees, Removal, Civil Procedure, Costs

Alyousef v. Alyousef, 2026 ONCA 374

[Roberts, Trotter and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

O. S. Chaudhry, for the appellants

ARA, acting in person

Keywords: Contracts, Corporations, Partnerships, Damages, Net After-Tax Profit, Alyousef v. Alyousef, 2026 ONCA 78, Alyousef v. Alyousef, 2026 ONCA 280

Ali v. Harris, 2026 ONCA 375

[Copeland, Monahan and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

MA, acting in person
M. L. Byers and L. Wade, for the respondent

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Accountants, Civil Procedure, Abuse of Process, Frivolous and Vexatious, Self-Represented Litigants

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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CIVIL DECISIONS

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SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

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John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email